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The meaning of a sentence determines how the truth of the proposition
expressed by the sentence may be proved and hence one would expect
proof theory to be influenced by meaning-theoretical considerations. In the
present Chapter we consider a proposal that also reverses the above priorities
and determines meaning in terms of proof. The proposal originates in the
criticism that Michael Dummett has voiced against a realist, truth-theoretical,
conception of meaning and has been developed largely by him and Dag
Prawitz, whose normalization procedures in technical proof theory constitute
the main technical basis of the proposal.
In a subject not more than 20 years old, and where much work is currently
being done, any survey is bound to be out of date when it appears. Accord-
ingly I have attempted not to give a large amount of technicalities, but rather
to present the basic underlying themes and guide the reader to the ever-
growing literature. Thus the Chapter starts with a general introduction to
meaning-theoretical issues and proceeds with a fairly detailed presentation of
Dummett's argument against a realist, truth-conditional, meaning theory. The
main part of the Chapter is devoted to a consideration of the alternative
proposal using 'proof-conditions', instead of truth-conditions, as the key
concept. Finally, the Chapter concludes with an introduction to the type
theory of Martin-Löf.
I am indebted to Professors Dummett, Martin-Löf and Prawitz, and to my
colleague Mr. Jan Lemniens, for many helpful conversations on the topics
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1. T H E O R I E S OF ME A N I N G , ME A N I N G T H E O R I E S
A N D T R U T H T H E O R I E S
A theory of meaning gives, one might not unreasonably expect, a general
account of, or view on, the very concept of meaning: what it is and how it
functions. Such theories about meaning, however, do not hold undisputed
rights to the appellation; in current philosophy of language one frequently
encounters discussions of theories of meaning for particular languages. Their
task is to specify the meaning of all the sentences of the language in question.
Following Peacocke [1981] I shall use the term 'meaning theory' for the
latter, language-relative, sort of theory and reserve 'theory of meaning' for
the former. Terminological confusion is, fortunately, not the only connection
between meaning theories and theories of meaning. On the contrary, the main
reason for the study and attempted construction of meaning theories is that
one hopes to find a correct theory of meaning through reflection on the
various desiderata and constraints that have to be imposed on a satisfactory
meaning theory. The study of meaning theories, so to speak, provides the
data for the theory of meaning. In the present Chapter we shall mainly treat
meaning theories and some of their connections with (technical) proof
theory and, consequently, we shall only touch on the theory of meaning in
passing. (On the other hand the whole Chapter can be viewed as a contri-
bution to the theory of meaning.)
There is, since Frege, a large consensus that the sentence, rather than the
word, is the primary bearer of (linguistic) meaning. The sentence is the least
unit of language that can be used to say anything. Thus the theory of mean-
ing directs that sentence-meaning is to be central in meaning theories and that
word-meaning is to be introduced derivatively: the meaning of a word is the
way in which the word contributes to the meaning of the sentences in which
it occurs. It is natural to classify the sentences of a language according to the
sort of linguistic act a speaker would perform through an utterance of the
sentence in question, be it an assertion, a question or a command. Thus, in
general, the meaning of a sentence seems to comprise (at least) two elements,
because to know the meaning of- in order to understand an utterance of-
the sentence in question one would have to know, first to what category the
sentence belongs, i.e., one would have to know what sort of linguistic act
that would be performed through an utterance of the sentence, and secondly
one would have to know the content of the act.
ΙΠ.8: PROOF T H E O R Y AND M E A N I N G 473
This diversity of sentence-meaning, together with the idea that word-
meaning is to be introduced derivatively (as a way of contributing to sentence-
meaning), poses a certain problern for the putative meaning-theorist. If
sentences from different categories have different kinds of meaning, it appears
that the meaning of a word will vary according to the category of the sen-
tences in which it occurs: uniform word-meanings are ruled out. But this is
unacceptable as anyone familiar with a dictionary knows. The word 'door',
say, has the same meaning in the three sentences 'Is the door open?', 'The
door is open.', and Open the door!'. This prima facie difficulty is turned
into a tool for investigating what internal structure ought to be imposed
on a satisfactory meaning theory.
A meaning theory will have to comprise at least two parts: the theory
of sense and the theory of force. The task of the latter is to identify the sort
of act performed through an utterance of a sentence and the former has to
specify the content of the acts performed. In order to secure the uniformity
of word meaning the theory of sense has to be formulated in terms of some
one key concept, in terms of which the content of all sentences is to be given,
and the theory of force has to provide uniform, general, principles relating
speech act to content. The meaning of a word is then taken as the way in
which the word contributes to the content of the sentences in which it
occurs (as given by the key concept in the theory of sense).
The use of such a notion of key concept also allows the meaning theories
to account for certain (iterative) unboundedness-phenomena in language,
e.g., that whenever A and B are understood sentences, then also 'A and B'
would appear to be meaningful. This is brought under control in the meaning
theory by expressing the condition for the application of the key concept P
to 'A and B' in terms of P applied to A and P applied to B.
The most popular candidate for a key concept has undeniably been truth:
the content of a sentence is given by its 'truth-condition'. One can, indeed,
find many philosophers who have subscribed to the idea that meaning is to
be given in terms of truth. Examples would be Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap,
Quine and Montague. It is doubtful, however, if they would accept that the
way in which truth serves to specify meaning is as a key concept in a meaning
theory (that is articulated into sense and force components respectively).
Such a conception of the relation between meaning and truth has been
advocated by Donald Davidson, who, in an important series of papers, start-
ing with [1967], and now conveniently collected in his [1984], has proposed
and developed the idea that meaning is to be studied via meaning theories.
Davidson is quite explicit on the role of truth. It is going to take its rightful
place within the meaning theory in the shape of a truth theory in the sense
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of Tarski [1956], Ch. VIII. Tarski showed, for a given formal language L,
how to define a predicate TrueL(x)' such that for every sentence S of L it is
provable from the definition that
(1) TnieL(S)iff/(,S).
Here '5' is a name of, and /(S) a translation of, the object-language sentence
S in the language of the meta-theory (= the theory in which the truth defi-
nition is given and where all instances of (1) must hold). Using the concept of
meaning (in the guise of 'translation' from object-language to meta-language)
Tarski gave a precise definition of what it is for a sentence of L to be true.
Davidson reverses the theoretical priorities. Starting with a truth theory for L,
that is a theory the language of which contains TrueL(x) as a primitive, and
where for each sentence 5 of L
(2) TrueL(S) iff p
holds for some sentence p of the language of the truth theory, he wanted to
extract meaning from truth. Simply to consider an arbitrary truth theory
will not do to capture meaning, though. It is certainly true that
(3) Snow is white is true-in-English iff snow is white
but, unquestionably and unfortunately, it is equally true that
(4) Snow is white is true-in-English iff grass is green
and the r.h.s. of (4) could not possibly by any stretch of imagination be said
to provide even a rough approximation of the meaning of the English sentence
Snow is white.
Furthermore, a theory that had all instances of (2) as axioms would be
unsatisfactory also in that it used infinitely many unrelated axioms; the
theory would, it is claimed, be 'unlearnable'.
Thus one might attempt to improve on the above simple-minded (2) by
considering truth theories that are formulated in a meta-language that con-
tains the object-language and that give their T-theorems' (the instances of
(2)), not as axioms, but as derivable from homophonic recursion clauses,
e.g.,
(5) for all A and B of L,
TrueL(,4 and 5) iff TrueL04) and TrueL(#)
and
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(6) for all A of L,
TrueL(not-,4) iff not-TrueL(,4).
Here one uses the word mentioned in the sentence on the Lh.s. when giving
the condition for its truth on the r.h.s.; cf. the above remarks on the iterative
unboundedness phenomena.
The treatment of quantification originally used Tarski's device of 'satis-
faction relative to assignment by sequences', where, in fact, one does not
primarily recur on truth, but on satisfaction, and where truth is defined as
satisfaction by all sequences. The problem which Tarski solved by the use of
the sequences and the auxiliary notion of satisfaction was how to capture the
right truth condition for 'everything is A1 even though the object-language
does not contain a name for everything to be considered in the relevant
domain of quantification. Another satisfactory solution, which goes back
to Frege, would be to use quantification over finite extensions L"1" of L by
means of new names. The interested reader is referred to Evans [1977],
Section 2 or to Davies [1981], Chapter VI for the (not too difficult) tech-
nicalities. A very extensive and careful canvassing of various alternative
approaches to quantificational truth-theories is given by Baldwin [1979].
If we by-pass the problem solved by Tarski and consider, say, the language
of arithmetic, where the problem does not arise as the language contains a
numeral for each element of the intended domain of quantification, the
universal-quantifier clause would be
(7) for all A of L,
TrueT.(for every number χ, Α (χ)) iff for every numeral k,
TrueL (Λ (£/*))
(here 'A(ïclx)' indicates the result of substituting the numeral k for the
variable x.)
Unfortunately it is still not enough to consider these homophonic, finitely
axiomatized truth theories in order to capture meaning. The basic clauses
of a homophonic truth theory will have the form, say,
(8) for any name F of L,
TrueL(f is red) iff whatever t refers to is red.
If we now change this clause to
(9) for any Γ in L,
is red) iff whatever t refers to is red and grass is green
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and keep homophonic clauses for Truei, with respect to 'and', 'not', etc.,
the result will still be a finitely axiomatized and correct ('true') truth theory
for L. (We could equally well have chosen any other true contingent sentence
instead of 'grass is green'.) Seen from the perspective of 'real meaning' the
truth condition of the primed theory is best explained as
(10) TrueL(S) iff S and grass is green.
The fact that a true, finitely axiomatized, homophonic truth-theory does
not necessarily provide truth conditions that capture meaning was first
observed by Foster and Loar in 1976. Various remedies and refinements of
the original Davidsonian programme have been explored. We shall briefly
consider an influential proposal due to John McDowell [1976, 1977, 1978].
The above attempts to find a meaning theory via truth start with
a (true) truth theory and go on to seek further constraints that have to be
imposed in order to capture meaning. McDowell, on the other hand, reverses
this strategy and starts by considering a satisfactory theory of sense. Such a
theory has to give content-ascriptions to the sentences S of the language L,
say in the general form
(11) S is Q iff p,
where p is a sentence of the meta-language that gives the content of S, and,
furthermore, the theory has to interact with a theory of force in such a way
that the interpreting descriptions, based on the contents as assigned in (11),
do in fact make sense of what speakers say and do when they utter sentences
containing S. A meaning theory, and thus also its theory of sense, is part of
an overall theory of understanding, the task of which is to make sense of
human behaviour (and not just these speech-acts). If the theory of sense can
serve as a content-specifying core in such a general theory, then (11) guaran-
tees that the predicate Q is (co-extensional with) truth. But not only that is
true; the pathological truth-theories that were manufactured for use in the
Foster-Loar counter-examples are ruled out from service as theories of sense
because their use would make the meaning theory issue incomprehensible, or
outright false, descriptions of what people do. A theory of sense which uses a
pathological truth-theory does not make sense. Thus we see that while an
adequate theory of sense will be a truth theory, the opposite is false: not
every truth theory for a language will be a theory of sense for the language.
In conclusion of the present section let us note the important fact that
the Tarski homophonic truth-theories are completely neutral with respect
to the underlying logic. The Γ-theorems are derivable from the basic
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homophonic recursion clauses using intuitionistic logic only (in fact even
minimal logic will do).
No attempt has been made in the present section to achieve either com-
pleteness or originality. The very substantial literature on the Davidsonian
programme is conveniently surveyed in two texts, Platts [1979] and Davies
[1981], where the latter pays more attention to the (not too difficult)
technicalities. Many of the important original papers are included in Evans
and McDowell [1976], with an illuminating introduction by the editors,
and Platts [1980], while mention has already been made of Davidson's
[1984] collection.of essays.
l
2. INTERMEZZO: CLASSICAL TRUTH AND SEQUENT CALCULI
(Intended for readers with some knowledge of the method 'semantic
tableaux', cf. Hodges, Chapter I.I, Section 6 or Sundholm, Chapter 1.2,
Section 3 of the Handbook.)
It is by now well-known that perhaps the easiest way to prove the complete-
ness of classical predicate logic is to search systematically for a counter-
model (or, more precisely, a falsifying 'semi-valuation', or 'model set') to the
formula, or sequent, in question. This systematic search proceeds according
to certain rules which are directly read off as necessary conditions from the
relevant semantics. For instance, in order to falsify Vx4(x)->£, one needs
to verify Vx4 (x) and falsify B, and in order to verify VxA (x) one has to
verify A(t) for every t, etc. Thus the rules for falsification, in fact, also
concern rules for verification and vice versa (consider verification of, e.g.,
~\B), and for each logical operator there will be two rules regulating the
systematic search for a counter-model, one for verification and one for
falsification. These rules turn out to be identical with Gentzen's [1934-
1935] left and right introduction rules for the same operators. In some
cases the search needs to take alternatives into account, e.g., A -+B is verified
by falsifying A or verifying B. Thus one has two possibilities. The failure of
the search along a possibility is indicated by that the rules would force one
to assign both truth and falsity to one and the same formula. This corre-
sponds, of course, to the axioms of Gentzen's sequent calculi. This method,
where failure of existence of counter-models is equivalent to existence of a
sequent calculus proof-tree, was discovered independently by Beth, Hintikka,
Kanger, and Schütte in the 1950s and a brilliant exposition can be found in
Kleene fl967J? Chapter VI. whereas SmuUyan (1968] is ihe canonical
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reference for the various ways of taking the basic insight into account.
Prawitz [1975] is a streamlined development of the more technical aspects
which provides an illuminating answer to the question as to why the rules
that generate counter-models turn out to be identical with the sequent
calculus rules. There one also finds a good introduction to the notion of
semi-valuation which has begun to play a role in recent investigations into the
semantics of natural language (cf. van Benthem and van Eijck [1982] for an
interesting treatment of the connection between recent work on 'partial
structures' in the semantics of natural language and the more proof-theoretical
notions that derive from the 'backwards' completeness proofs).
These semantical methods for proving completeness also lend themselves
to immediate proof-theoretical applications. The Cut-free sequent calculus
is complete, but cut is a sound rule. Hence it is derivable. A connection with
the topic of our Chapter is forged by reversing these proof-theoretic uses of
semantical methods. Instead of proving the completeness via semantics,
one could start by postulating the completeness of a cut-free formalism, and
read off a semantics from the left and right introduction rules. (Proof theory
determines meaning.) Such an approach was suggested by Hacking [1979] in
an attempt towards a criterion for logical constanthood. Unfortunately,
his presentation is marred by diverse technical infelicities (cf. Sundholm
[1981 ] ), and the problem still remains open how to find a workable proposal
along these lines.
3. DUMMETT'S ARGUMENT AGAINST A TRUTH-CONDITIONAL
V I E W O N M E A N I N G
In the present Section I attempt to set out one version of an argument due to
Michael Dummett to the effect that truth cannot adequately serve as a key
concept in a satisfactory meaning theory. Dummett has presented his argu-
ment in many places (cf. the note at the end of the Section) and the presen-
tation I offer is not to be attributed to him. In particular, the emphasis on
manifestation that can be found in the present version of Dummett's argument
I have come to appreciate through the writings of Colin McGinn [1980] and
Crispin Wright [1976]. Dummett's most forceful exposition is still his
[1976], which will be referred to as "WTM2".
Dummett's views on the role and function of meaning theories are only in
partial agreement with those presented in Section 1. The essential difference
consists mainly in the strong emphasis on what it is to know a language that
can be found in Dummett's writings, and as a consequence his meaning
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theories are firmly cast in an epistemological mould: "questions about
meaning are best interpreted as questions of understanding: a dictum about
what the meaning of a sentence consists in must be construed as a thesis
about what it is to know its meaning" (WTM2, p. 69). The task of the mean-
ing theorist is to give a theoretical (propositional) representation of the
complex practical capacity one has when one knows how to speak a language.
The knowledge that a speaker will have of the propositions that constitute
the theoretical representation in question will, in the end, have to be implicit
knowledge. Indeed, one cannot demand that a speaker should be able to
articulate explicitly those very principles that constitute the theoretical
representation of his practical mastery. Thus a meaning theory that gives
such a theoretical representation must also comprise a part that would state
what it is to know the other parts implicitly.
The inner structure of a meaning theory that could serve the aims of
Dummett will have to be different from the simple bipartite version con-
sidered in Section 1. Dummett's meaning theories are to be structured as
follows. There is to be (ia) a core theory of semantic value, which states the
condition for the application of the key concept to the sentences of the
language, and, furthermore, there must be (ii) a theory of force, as before.
In between these two, however, there must be (ib) a theory of sense, whose
task it is to state what it is to know what is stated in the theory of semantic
value, i.e., what it is to know the condition for the application of the key
concept to a sentence. Thus the theory of sense in the proposals from Section
1 does not correspond to the theory of senseß - 'D' for Dummett - but
to the theory of semantic value. (The Fregean origin of Dummett's tripartite
structure should be obvious. For further elaboration cf., e.g., his [1981].)
The theory of senseß has no matching part in the theories from Section 1.
The corresponding match is as follows:
Dummett (Davidson-^) McDowell
(ia) Theory of semantic value (i) Theory of sense
(applies key concept to
sentences)
(ib) Theory of senseB
(states what it is to
know the theory of
semantic value)
(u) The theory of force (ii) The theory of force
1
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This difference is what lies at the heart of the matter in the discussion
between Dummett and McDowell of whether a theory of meaning ought to
be 'modest' or 'fullblooded' (cf. McDowell [1977], Section X: should one
demand that the meaning theory must give a link-up with practical capacities
independently of, and prior to, the theory offorcel).
One should also note here that the right home for the theory of sense^ is
not quite clear. Here I have made it part of the meaning theory. It could
perhaps be argued that a statement of wherein knowledge of meaning consists
is something that had better be placed within a theory of meaning rather than
in a meaning theory. Dummett himself does not draw the distinction between
meaning theories and theories of meaning and one can, it seems to me, find
traces of both notions in what Dummett calls a 'theory of meaning'.
Dummett's argument against the truth-theoretical conception of meaning
makes essential use of the assumption that the meaning theories must contain
a theory of senseD, which Dummett explicates in terms of how it can be
manifested: since the knowledge is implicit, possession thereof can be con-
strued only in terms of how one manifests that knowledge. Furthermore,
this implicit knowledge of meaning, or more precisely, of the condition for
applying the key concept to individual sentences, must be fully manifested
in use. This is Dummett's transformation of Wittgenstein's dictum that
meaning is use. Two reasons can be offered (cf. McGinn [1980], p. 20).
First, knowledge is one of many prepositional attitudes and these are, in
general, only attributed to agents on the basis of how they are manifested.
Secondly, and more importantly, we are concerned with (implicit) knowledge
of meaning and meaning is, par excellence, a vehicle of (linguistic) communi-
cation. If there were some components of the implicit knowledge that did not
become fully manifest in use, they could not matter for communication and
so they would be superfluous.
It was already noted above that the Tarskian truth-theories are completely
neutral with respect to the logical properties of truth. What laws are obeyed
is determined by the logic that is applied in the meta-theory, whereas the
Γ-clauses themselves offer no information on this point. Dummett's argument
is brought to bear not so much against Tarskian truth as against the possi-
bility that the key concept could be 'recognition-transcendent'. Classical,
bivalent truth is characterized by the law of bivalence that every sentence
is either true or false independently of our capacity to decide, or find out,
whichever is the case. Thus, in general, the truth-conditions will be such that
they can obtain without us recognizing that they do. There are a number of
critical cases which produce such undecidable truth-conditions. (It should be
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noted that 'undecidable' is perhaps not the best choice here with its con-
notations from recursive function theory.) Foremost among these is un-
doubtedly quantification over infinite or unbounded domains. Fermat's
last theorem and the Riemann hypothesis are both famous examples from
mathematics and their form is purely universal VxA(x), with decidable
matrix A(x). An existential example would be, say, 'Somewhere in the
universe there is a little green stone-eater'. Other sorts of examples are given
by, respectively, counterfactual conditionals and claims about sentience in
others, e.g., 'Ronald Reagan is in pain'. A fourth class is given by statements
about (remote). past and future time, e.g., 'A city will be built here in a
thousand years', or 'Two seconds before Brutus stabbed Caesar thirty-nine
geese cackled on the Capitol'.
The knowledge one has of how to apply the key concept cannot in its
entirety be statable, explicit knowledge and so the theory of senseo will have
to state, for at least some sentences, how one manifests knowledge of the
condition for applying the key concept to them, in ways other than stating
what one knows explicitly. Let us call the class of these 'the non-statable
fragment'. (Questions of the 'division of linguistic labour' may arise here.
Is the fragment necessarily unique? Cf. McGinn [1980], p. 22).
Assume now for a reductio that bivalent, possibly recognition-transcen-
dent, truth-conditions can serve as key concept in a (Dummettian) meaning
theory. Thus the theory of senseo has to state how one fully manifests
knowledge of possibly recognition-transcendent truth-conditions. The 'possi-
bly' can be removed: there are sentences in the non-statable fragment with
undecidable truth-conditions. In order to see this, remember the four classes
of undecidable sentences that were listed above. Demonstrably, undecidable
sentences are present in the language, and they must be present already in
the non-statable fragment, because "the existence of such sentences cannot
be due solely to the occurrence of sentences introduced by purely verbal
explanations: a language all of whose sentences were decidable would con-
tinue to have this property when enriched by expressions so introduced"
(WTM2, p. 81). An objection that may be (and has been) raised here is that
one could start with a decidable fragment, e.g., the atomic sentences of
arithmetic and get the undecidability through addition of new sentence-
operators such as quantifiers. That is indeed so, but is not relevant here,
where one starts with a larger language that, as a matter of fact, contains
undecidable sentences and then isolates a fragment within this language
that also will have this property. Decidable sentences used for definitions
could only provide decidable sentences and hence some of the sentences
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of the full language would be left out. Also it is not permissible to speak
of adding, say, the quantifiers as their nature is sub judice: the meaning
of a quantifier is not something independent of the rest of the language
but, like any other word, its meaning is the way it contributes to the meaning
of the sentences in which it occurs.
Now the argument is nearly at its end. The theory of sense/j would be
incomplete in that it could not state what it is to manifest fully implicit
knowledge of the recognition-transcendent truth-condition of an undecidable
sentence. If the theory attempted to do this, an observational void would
exist without observational warrant. We, as theorists, would be guilty of
theoretical slack in our theory, because we could never see the agents mani-
fest their implicit knowledge in response to the truth-conditions obtaining
(or not), because, ex hypothesi, they obtain unrecognizably. The agents,
furthermore, could not see them obtain and so, independently of whether
or not the theorist can see them response, they cannot manifest their know-
ledge in response to the truth-condition. (This is a point where the division
of linguistic labour may play a role.)
Before we proceed it might be useful to offer a short schematic summary
of Dummett's argument as set out above. (Page references in brackets are to
WTM2.)
(1) To understand a language is to have knowledge of meaning, (p. 69).
(2) Knowledge of meaning must in the end be implicit knowledge, (p. 70).
(3) Hence the meaning theory must contain a part, call it theory of
senses, that specifies "in what having this knowledge consists, i.e.,
what counts as a manifestion of that knowledge." (pp. 70-71 and
p. 127).
(4) There are sentences in the language such that the speaker manifests
his knowledge of their meaning in ways other than stating the mean-
ing in other words. (The non-statable fragment is non-empty.) (p. 81).
(5) Assume now that bivalent truth can serve as key concept. Bivalent
truth-conditions are sometimes undecidable and hence recognition-
transcendent, (p. 81).
(6) Already in the non-statable fragment there must be sentences with
recognition-transcendent truth-conditions, (p. 81).
(7) Implicit knowledge of recognition-transcendent truth-conditions
cannot be manifested, and so the theory of senseo is incomplete,
(p. 82).
Supplementary notes concerning the argument:
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(a) Dummett's argument is quite general and does not rest at all on
any specific features of the language concerned. When it is applied to a
particular area of discourse, or for a particular class of statements, it will
lead to a metaphysical anti-realism for the area in question. Many examples
of this can be found in Dummett's writings. Thus [1975] and [1977] both
develop the argument within the philosophy of mathematics. The intuition-
istic criticism of classical reasoning, and the ensuing explanations of the
logical constants offered by Heyting, provided the main inspiration for
Dummett's work on anti-realism. It should be stressed, however, and as is
emphasized by Dummett himself in [1975], that the semantical argument in
favour of a constructivist philosophy of mathematics is very far from
Brouwer's own position.
In Dummett [1969] another one of the four critical classes of sentences
is studied, viz. those concerning time, and in WTM2, Section 3, a discussion
of counterfactual conditionals can be found, as well as a discussion of certain
reductionist versions of anti-realism. They arise when the truth of statement
A is reduced to the (simultaneous) truth of a certain possibly infinite class of
reduction-sentences MA. If it so happens that the falsity of the conjunction
Λ\ MA does not entail the truth of the conjunction /A M-*A, then bivalence
will fail for the statement A. Examples of such reductionist versions of anti-
realism can be found in phenomenalistic reductions of material objects or of
sentience in others.
(b) It should be noted that Dummett's anti-realism, while verificationist
in nature, must not be conflated with logico-empiricist verificationism. With
a lot of simplification the matter can be crudely summarized by noting that
for the logical empiricists classical logic was sacrosanct and certain sentences
have non-verifiable classical truth-conditions. Hence they have no meaning.
Dummett reverses this reasoning: obviously meaningful sentences have no
good meaning if meaning is construed truth-conditionally. Hence classical
meaning-theories are wrong.
(c) As one should expect, Dummett's anti-realist argument has not been
allowed to remain uncontroverted. John McDowell has challenged the
demand that the meaning theories should comprise a theory of sense/).
In his [1977] and [1978] the criticism is mainly by implication as he is
there more concerned with the development of the positive side of his own
'modest' version of a meaning theory, whereas in [1981] he explicitly ques-
tions the cogency of Dummett's full-blooded theories. McDowell's [1978a]
is an answer to Dummett's [1969], and McDowell in his turn has found a
critic in Wright [1980a].
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Colin McGinn has been another persistent critic of Dummett's anti-realism
and he has launched counter-arguments against most aspects of Dummett's
position, cf. e.g., his [1980], [1979] and [1982].
Crispin Wright [1982] challenges Dummett by observing that a Strict
Finitist can criticize a Dummettian constructivist in much the same way as a
constructivist uses Dummett's argument against a mathematical Platonist
and so the uniquely priviliged position that is claimed for constructivism
(as the only viable alternative to classical semantics) is under pressure.
(d) Another sort of criticism is offered by Dag Prawitz [1977, 1978],
who, like Wright, is in general sympathy with large parts of Dummett's
meaning-theoretical position. Prawitz questions the demand for full mani-
festation and suggests that the demand for a theory of senseD be replaced
by an adequacy condition on meaning theories T:
if T is to be adequate, it must be possible
to derive in T the implication
if P knows the meaning of A, then P shows behaviour^.
Prawitz [1978], p. 27
(Here "BA " is a kind of behaviour counted as a sign of grasping the meaning
of A.)
The difference between this adequacy criterion and the constraints that
McDowell imposes on his modest theories is not entirely clear to me. Only
if the behaviour is to be shown before, and independently of, the theory of
force (whose task it is to issue just the interpreting descriptions that tell
what behaviour was exhibited by P) could something like a modification
of Dummett's argument be launched and even then it does not seem certain
that the desired conclusion can be reached.
(e) In the presentation of Dummett's argument I have relied solely on
WTM2. The anti-realist argument can be found in many places though,
e.g., [1973], Chapter 13, [1969], [1975] and [1975a] as well as the recent
[1982]. It should be noted that Dumme« often, cf. e.g., [1969], lays equal
or more stress on the acquisition of knowledge rather than its manifestion.
Most of the articles mentioned are conveniently reprinted in TE.
Wright [1981], a review of TE, gives a good survey of Dummett's work.
Similarly, in his book [1980] Wright offers extensive discussion of anti-
realist themes.
The already mentioned McGinn [1980] and Prawitz [1977], while not
in entire agreement with Dummett, both give excellent expositions of the
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basic issues. It is a virtually impossible task to give a complete survey of the
controversy around Dummett's anti-realist position. In recent years almost
every issue of the Journal of Philosophy, Mind and Analysis, as well as the
Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, contains material that directly, or
indirectly, concerns itself with the Dummettian argument.
4 . P R O O F A S A K E Y C O N C E P T I N M E A N I N G T H E O R I E S
As was mentioned above the traditional intuitionistic criticism of classical
mathematical reasoning, cf. e.g., van Dalen [this volume], was an important
source of inspiration for Dummett's anti-realist argument and it is also to
intuitionism that he turns in his search for an alternative key-concept to be
used in the meaning theories in place of the bivalent, recognition-transcendent
truth-conditions.
The simplest technical treatment of the truth-conditions approach to
semantics is undoubtedly provided by the standard truth-tables (which, of
course, are incorporated in the Tarski-treatment for, say, full predicate
logic) and it is the corresponding constructive 'proof-tables' of Heyting
that offer a possibility for Dummett's positive proposal. Heyting's explana-
tions of the logical constants, cf. his [1956], Chapter 7, and [1960], can
be set out roughly as follows;
A proof of the is given
proposition by
Α Λ Β a proof of A and a proof of Β
Α ν Β a proof of A or a proof of Β
A-+B a method for obtaining proofs of Β
from proofs of A
L nothing
Vx EDA (x) a method which for every individual
d in D provides a proof of A (<ƒ)
3x €E D Α (χ) an individual d in D and a proof
ofA(d).
There are various versions of the above table of explanations, e.g., the one
offered by Kreisel [1962], where 'second clauses' have been included in the
explanations for implication and universal quantification to the effect that
one has to include also a proof that the methods really have the properties
required in the explanations above. The matter is dealt with at length in
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involved and where extensive bibliographical information can be found, cf.
also Section 7 below on the type theory of Martin-Löf.
In the above explanations the meaning of a proposition is given by its
'proof condition' and, as was emphatically stressed by Kreisel [1962], in
some sense, 'we recognize a proof when we see one'. Thus it seems that the
anti-realistic worries of Dummett can be alleviated with the use of proof as a
key-concept in meaning theories. (I will return to this question in the next
section.) Independently of the desired immunity from anti-realist strictures,
however, there are a number of other points that need to be taken into
account here.
First among these is a logical gem invented by Prior [I960]. In the Heyting
explanations the meaning of a proposition is given by its proof-condition.
Conversely, does every proof-condition give a proposition? A positive answer
to this question appears desirable, but the notion 'proof-condition' needs to
be much more elucidated if any headway is to be made here. Prior noted that
if by 'proof-conditions' one understands 'rules that regulate deductive practice'
then a negative answer is called for. Let us introduce a proposition-forming
operator, or connective, 'tank" by stipulating that its deductive practice is to
be regulated by the following Natural Deduction rules (I here alter Prior's
rules inessentially):
tonk I
tonk£·
A tonkB Λ t o n k 5
A tonkB A tonk B
~T~ S
As Prior observes one then readily proves false conclusion from true premises
by means of first tonk ƒ and then tonk E. In fact, given these two rules any
two propositions are logically equivalent via the following derivation:
A1 B2(tonk I )- -  · — (tonk I)
A tonk B A tonkB
Thus tonk leads to extreme egalitarianism in the underlying logic: from a
logical point of view there is only one proposition. This is plainly absurd and
something has gone badly wrong. Hence it is clear (and only what could be
expected) that some constraints are needed for how the proof-conditions are
to be understood; 'rules regulating deductive practice' is simply too broad.
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There is quite a literature dealing with tonk and the problems it causes:
Stevenson [1961], Wagner [1981], Hart [1982], and, perhaps most impor-
tantly from our point of view, Belnap [1962], more about which below.
The relevance of the tonk-problem for our present interests, was as far as I
know, first noted by Dummett [1973], Chapter 13.
A second point to consider is the so-called paradox of inference, cf.
Cohen and Nagel [1934], pp. 173-176. This 'paradox' arises because of
the tension between (a) the fact that a correct application of a logically
valid inference seems to presuppose that the truth of the conclusion is already
contained in the truth of the premises, and (b) the fact that logical inference
is a way to gain 'new' knowledge. Cohen and Nagel formulate it thus:
If in an inference the conclusion is not contained in the premise,
it cannot be valid; and if the conclusion is not different from
the premises, it is useless; but the conclusion cannot be contained
in the premises and also possess novelty; hence inferences cannot
be both valid and useful.
[1934], p.173.
So there is a tension between the legitimacy (the validity) and the utility of
an inference, and one could perhaps reformulate the question posed by the
'paradox' as: How can logic function as a useful epistemological tool? For an
inference to be legitimate, the process of recognizing the premises as true
must already have accomplished what is needed for the recognition of the
truth of the conclusion, but if it is to be useful the recognition of the truth
of the conclusion does not have to be present when the truth of the premises
is ascertained. This is how Dummett poses the question in [1975a].
How does one use reasoning to gain new truths? By starting with known
premises and drawing further conclusions. In most cases the use of valid
inference has very little to do with how one would normally set about to
verify the truth of something. For instance, the claim that I have seven
coins in my pocket is best established by means of counting them. It would
be possible, however, to deduce this fact from a number of diverse premises
and some axioms of arithmetic. (The extra premises would be, say, that I
began the day with a £50 note, and I have then made such and such purchases
for such and such sums, receiving such and such notes and corns in return,
etc.) This would be a highly indirect way in comparison with the straight-
forward counting process. The utility of logical reasoning lies in that it
provides indirect means of learning the truth of statements. Thus in order
to account for this usefulness it seems that there must be a gap between
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the most direct ways of learning the truth and the indirect ways provided
by logic. If we now explain meaning in terms of proof, it seems that we
close this gap. The direct means, given directly by the meaning, would coin-
cide, so to speak, with the indirect means of reasoning. The indirect means
have then been made a part of the direct means of reasoning. (One should
here compare the difference between direct and indirect means of recognizing
the truth with the solution to the 'paradox' offered by Cohen and Nagel
[1934] that is formulated in terms of a concept called 'conventional
meaning'.)
The constraints we seek on our proof-explanations thus should take into
account, on the one hand, that one must not be too liberal as witnessed by
tonk, and, on the other hand, one must not make the identification between
proof and meaning so tight that logic becomes useless.
Already Belnap [1962] noted what was wrong with tonk from our point
of view. The (new) deductive practice that results from adding tonk with its
stipulative rules, is not conservative over the old one. Using Dummett's
[1975] terminology, there is no harmony between the grounds for asserting,
and the consequences that may be drawn from, a sentence of the form
A tonk B. The introduction and elimination rules must, so to speak, match,
not just in that each connective has introduction and elimination rules, but
also in that they must not interfere with the previous practice. Hence it seems
natural to let one of the (two classes of) rules serve as meaning-giving and
let the other one be chosen in such a way that it(s members) can be justified
according to the meaning-explanation. Such a method of proceeding would
also take care of the 'paradox' of inference: one of the two types of rules
would now serve as the direct, meaning-given (because meaning-giving!)
way of learning the truth and the other would serve to provide the indirect
means (in conjunction with other justified rules, of course).
The introduction rules are the natural choice for our purpose, since they
are synthesizing rules; they explain how a proof of, say Λ $ Β, can be formed
in terms of given proofs of A and of B, and thus some sort of composition-
ality is present (which is required for a key concept). Tentatively then,
the meaning of a sentence is given by what counts as a direct (or canonical)
proof of it. Other ways of formulating the same explanation would be to
say that the meaning is given by the direct grounds for asserting, or by what
counts as a direct verification of, the sentence in question. An (indirect)
proof of a sentence would be a method, or program, for obtaining a direct
proof.
In order to see that a sentence is true one does not in general have to
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produce the direct grounds for asserting it and so the desired gap between
truth and truth-as-established-by-the-most-direct-means is open. Note that
one could still say that the meaning of a sentence is given by its truth-con-
dition, although the latter, of course, has to be understood in a way different
from that of bivalent, and recognition-transcendent, truth: if a sentence is
true it is possible to give a proof of it and this in turn can be used to produce
a direct proof. Thus in order to explain what it is for a sentence to be true
one has to explain what a direct proof of the sentence would be and, hence,
one has to explain the meaning of the sentence in order to explain its truth-
condition.
All of this is highly programmatic and it remains to be seen if, and how,
the notion of direct (canonical) proof (verification, ground for asserting) can
be made sense of also outside the confined subject-matter of mathematics.
In the next Section I shall attempt to spell out the Heyting explanations once
again, but now in a modified form that closely links up with the discussion in
the present Section and with the so-called normalization theorems in Natural
Deduction style proof theory.
5. THE MEANING OF THE LOGICAL CONSTANTS AND THE
SOUNDNESS OF PREDICATE LOGIC
In the present section, where knowledge of Natural Deduction rules is pre-
supposed, we reconsider Hey ting's explanations and show that the intro-
duction and elimination rules are sound for the intended meaning.
Thus we assume that A and B are meaningful sentences, or propositions,
and, hence that we know what proofs (and direct proofs) are for them.
The conjunction Α Λ Β is a proposition, such that a canonical proof of
Α Λ Β has the form
where Dj and D2 are (not necessarily direct) proofs of A and B, respectively.
On the basis of this meaning-explanation of the proposition Α Λ Β, the rule
(Λ ƒ) is seen to be valid. We have to show that whenever the two premises
A and Β are true, then so is Α Λ Β. When A and Β are true, they are so on
the basis of proof and hence there can be found two proofs £>! and Z)2
respectively of A and B. These proofs can then be used to obtain a canonical
proof of Α Λ Β, which therefore is true.
490 , G Ö R A N S U N D H O L M
Consider the elimination rule (Λ-Ε"), say, —-—, and assume that Α Λ Β is
Β
true. We have to see that Β is true. Α Λ Β is true on the basis of a proof D,
which by the above meaning-explanation can be used to obtain a canonical
proof D3 of the form specified above. Thus D2 is a proof of Β and thus Β
is true.
Next we consider the implication A-+B, which is a proposition that is
true if Β is true on the assumption that A is true. Alternatively we may say
that a canonical proof of A -+B has the form
A1
D
B
where D is a proof of B using the assumption A. Again, the introduction rule
(-*·ƒ) is sound, since what has to be shown is that if B is true on the hypo-
thesis that A is true, then A -»£ is true. But this is directly granted by the
meaning explanation above. For the elimination rule we consider
B
and suppose that we have proofs D ι and£>2 of respectively A -+B and Λ. As
Z>i is a proof it can be used to obtain a canonical proof D3 and thus we can
find a hypothetical proof D of B from>l. But then
m
A
D
B
is a proof of B and thus B is true and (-*· E) is a valid rule.
The disjunction A v B is a proposition, with canonical proofs of the forms
and J>a
B
where D\ and £>2 are proofs of respectively A and B. The introduction rules
are immediately seen to be valid, since they produce canonical proofs of their
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true premise. For the elimination rule, we assume that A v B is true, that C is
true on assumption that A is true, and that C is true on assumption that B is
true. Thus there are proofs Dit D2 and D3 of, respectively A v 5, C and C,
where the latter two proofs are hypothetical, depending on respectively A
and B. The proof D\ can be used to obtain a canonical proof D4 of A v B in
one of the two forms above, say the right, and sOjD4 contains a subproof Ds,
that is a proof of B. Then we readily find a proof of C by combining D
s
 with
the hypothetical D3 to get a proof of C, which thus is a true proposition.
The absurdity 1 is a proposition which has no canonical proof. We have to
see that the rule— is valid. Thus, we have to see that whenever the propo-
A.
sition i is true, then also A is true. But i is never true, since a proof of i could
be used to obtain a canonical proof of 1 and by the explanation above there
are no direct proofs of 1.
The universal quantification (Vx&M)A(x) is a proposition such that its
canonical proofs have the form
D
that is, the proof D of the premise is a hypothetical, free-variable, proof of
A(x) from the assumption that x&M. Again the introduction rule is valid,
since if A(x) is true on the hypothesis that χ G Af, there can be found a hypo-
thetical proof of A(x) from assumption x&M, and thus we immediately
obtain a canonical proof of (VxEM)A(x). For the elimination rule (V/T)
consider
and suppose that the premises are true. Thus proofs Z>i and Z>2 °f» respect-
ively, (Vx € M)A (x) and d&M, can be found. As Dj is a proof it can be used
to obtain a direct proof of its conclusion, and hence we can extract a hypo-
thetical proof D3 of A(x) from assumption χ £ M. Combining D2 with the
free-variable proof £>3 gives a proof
DI ('Z>3 (dix)' indicates the
d E M result of substituting
D3(dlx) dfotxinD3.)
A(d)
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of A (d), so the rule (V /f) is sound.
Finally, the existential quantification (3x £M)A(x) is a proposition such
that its canonical proofs have the (3 /) form
Dl £>2
A(d) d&M
(Ιχ(ΞΜ)Α(χ)
Again the introduction rule is immediately seen to be valid as it produces
canonical proofs of its conclusion from proofs of the premises. For the
elimination rule (3£) consider the situation that (3x EM)A(x) is true,
and that C is true on the assumptions that χ is in M and A (x) is true. Thus
there can be found a proof D3 of (3x&M)A(x) and a hypothetical free-
variable proof Z>4 of C from hypotheses χ &Μ and A(x). The proof D3 can
be used to obtain a canonical proof of the form above, and combining the
proofs Dj and D2 with the hypothetical free-variable proof £>4 we obtain
a proof of C:
D2 D,
d&M A(d)
Thus the rules of the intuitionistic predicate logic are all valid; no corre-
sponding validation is known for, say, the classical law of Bivalence A v ~v4
where ~>A is defined as A -*· 1.
The above treatment has been less precise and complete than would be
desirable owing to limitations of space. First, questions of syntax have been
left out especially where the quantifier rules are concerned, and secondly a
whole complex of problems that arises from the fact that we need to know
that A(x) is a proposition for any χ in M in order to know that, say, (Vx €
M)A (x) is a proposition has been ignored. The interested reader is referred
to the type theory of Martin-Lof [1984] for detailed consideration and
careful treatment of (analogues to) these and other lacunae, e.g., how to
treat atomic sentences in our presentation.
The above explanations of why the rules of predicate logic are valid all
follow the same pattern. The introduction rules are immediately seen to be
valid, since canonical proofs are given introductory form. The elimination
rules are then seen to be valid by noting that the introduction and elimi-
nation rules have the required harmony. The canonical grounds for asserting
a sentence do contain sufficient grounds also for the consequences that may
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be drawn via the elimination rules for the sentence in question. Thus, in fact,
we have here made use of the reduction steps first isolated and used by
Prawitz [1965, 1971], in his proofs of the normalization theorems for
Natural Deduction-style formalizations.
Prawitz has in a long series of papers {1973, 1974, 1975, 1978, and
1980] been concerned to use this technical insight for meaning-theoretical
purposes. His main concern, however, has been to give an explication of the
notion of valid argument rather than to give direct meaning explanations in
terms of proof. In the presentation here, which is inspired by Martin-Löfs
meaning-explanations for his type theory, I have been more concerned with
the task of giving constructivistic meaning-explanations while relying on the
standard explication of validity as preservation of truth for a justification of
the standard rules of inference.
One should, however, stop to consider the extent to which the above
explanations constitute a meaning theory in the sense of Section 1 above. In
particular, in Section 4 a promise was given to return to question of decid-
ability. Is it in fact true that the notion of proof is decidable? On our presen-
tation at least this much is true: if we already have a proof it is decidable if
it is in canonical form. As to the general question I would be inclined to
think that the notion of proof is semi-decidable, in that we recognize a proof
when we see one, but when we don't see one that does not necessarily mean
that there is no proof there. One can compare the situation with under-
standing a meaningful sentence: we understand a meaningful sentence when
we see (or hear!) one but if we don't understand that does not necessarily
mean that there is nothing there to be understood. Failure to understand
a meaningful sentence seems parallel to failure to follow, or grasp, a proof.
Such a position, then, would not make the 'proof-condition' recognition-
transcendent; when it obtains it can be seen to obtain, but when it is not
seen to obtain no judgement is given (unless, of course, it is seen not to
obtain). Apart from the question of decidability, an important difference
is that in explanations such as the above there is no mention of implicit
knowledge and the like. It seems correct to speak of a theoretical repre-
sentation of a (constructivistic) deductive practice, but it seems less natural
to say that these explanations are known to everyone who draws logical
inferences.
We used the notion of canonical proof as a key concept in order to provide
the explanations, and in the literature one can find a number of alternatives
as to how one ought to specify these, cf. the papers by Prawitz listed above.
In particular, one might wish to insist that all parts of a canonical proof
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should also be canonical (as is the case with the so-called normal derivations
obtained by Prawitz in his normalization theorem [1971]). The choice I
opted for here was motivated by, first, the success of the meaning-explana-
tions of Martin-Löf in his type theory and, secondly, the fact that in Hallaas
[1983] a successful normalization of strong set-theoretic systems is carried
out using an analogous notion of normal derivation. (Tennant's [1982] and
his book [1978] are also interesting to the set-theoretically curious; in the
former a treatment of the paradoxes is offered along Natural Deduction
lines, and the latter contains a neat formulation of the rules of set theory.)
Finally we should note that the explanations offered here have turned the
formal system into an interpreted formal system (modulo not inconsiderable
imprecision in the formulation of syntax and explanations). This is the main
reason for the avoidance of Greek letters in the present Chapter.
6. Q U E S T I O N S OF C O M P L E T E N E S S
In Section 5 the meaning of the logical constants was explained and the
standard deductive practice justified. In the case of classical, bivalent logic
we know that the connectives Λ, ν and ~> are complete in that any truth-
function can be generated from them. Does the corresponding property
hold here? Clearly the answer is dependent on how the canonical proofs
may be formed. It was shown by Prawitz [1978] and, independently of
him, by Zucker and Tragresser [1978] that if we restrict ourselves to purely
schematic means for obtaining canonical proofs (and for logical constants
this does not seem unreasonable), then an affirmative answer is possible to
the above question. As a typical example consider, e.g., this Sheffer-stroke
(which of course makes sense constructively as well). This is given the intro-
dution rule (| ƒ)
A 1 B1'2
A definition using Λ, -*· and i is found by putting A \B ^ ^A Λ Β -»· 1, If there
are more premise-derivations in the introduction rule (= the rule for how
canonical proofs may be obtained) for each of these one will get an impli-
cation of the above sort and they are all joined together by conjunctions.
(Here it is presupposed that the rules have only finitely many premises.
This does not seem unreasonable.) Finally, if there are more introduction
I
t
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rules than one, the conjunctions are put together into a disjunction. (Here it
is presupposed that there are only finitely many introduction rules. Again this
does not seem unreasonable).
Only one case remains, namely that there are no introduction rules. Then
there are no canonical proofs to be found and we have got the absurdity.
Thus the fragment based on -»·, Λ, ν and 1 is complete. For further details
refer to the two original papers above as well as Schroeder-Heister [1982].
It should be noted that by Hendry [1981] we know that Α Λ Β is equivalent
also intuitionistically to (A *-»· B) ·«—*· (Α ν Β) and that A -+B is equivalent
to Β ·*—*· Α ν B. .Thus also ·<-*·, ν and 1 are complete.
The standard elimination-rules (Λ/Γ) can be replaced by the following
rule:
A'". .B2
which rule seems quite well-motivated by the analogy with the introduction
A B
rule -  - : everything which can be derived from the two premises A and B
Α Λ Β
used as assumptions can also be derived from Α Λ Β alone. The (ν Ε) rule has
exactly this general pattern and the intuitionistic absurdity rule is a degen-
erate case without minor premise C:
Only implication does not obey the above pattern. Here the premise of the
introduction rule is not just a sentence, but a hypothetical judgement that 5
is true whenever A is true. Thus, we have a sort of rule as premise: from A go
to B, in symbols Λ =* B. If we may use such rules as dischargable assumptions,
one can keep the standard pattern also for implication, viz.
A <* B1
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whereas if we try to do the same using implication for the arrow =*·, we end
up with the triviality
A-+B
which does not allow us to derive even modus ponens.
Using the rule with the higher level assumption A =*B one can derive
(-> E) as follows:
A^B B
B
•(A
Given the use of the rule A =>B as an assumption, from premise A we can
proceed to conclusion B, and the use of the major premise A -+ B allows to
discharge the use of the rule A=>B.
This type of higher-level assumptions was introduced by Schroeder-
Heister [1981] and it is a most interesting innovation in Natural Deduction-
formulations of logic, cf. also his [1982] and [1983]. The elimination rule
that the Prawitz method gives to the Sheffer-stroke would be
A\B
which follows the above pattern, but uses implication and conjunction. With
the Schroeder-Heister conventions the rule can be given as
A \B
In words, if C is true under the assumptions that we may go from the premises
A and B to conclusion i, then C is a consequence of A \ B alone.
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In Schroeder-Heister [1984] an extension of the above results is given and
completeness is established also for the predicate calculus language.
The other question of completeness is also considered by Schroeder-
Heister [1983] : is every valid inference derivable from the introduction and
elimination rules? This question gets a positive answer, but the concept of
, . , . . , . ( A A£)AC
validity is extremely restnctive, e.g., the rule is not a valid rule,
A
cf. [1983], p. 374, which (given the concept of validity used in the present
paper) it obviously must be. Thus I would consider the problem, first posed
by Prawitz [19.73], to establish the completeness of the predicate logic, for
the present sort of meaning explanations, still to be open.
7 .THE TYPE T H E O R Y OF M A R T I N - L O F
Frege [1893], in the course of carrying out his logicist programme, designed
a full-scale, completely formal language that was intended to suffice for
mathematical practice. By today's standards, an almost unique feature of his
attempt to secure a foundation of mathematics is that he uses an interpreted
formal language for which he provides careful meaning explanations. The
language proposed was, as we now know, not wholly successful, owing to the
intervention of Russell's paradox. (The effects of the paradox on Frege's
explanations of meaning are explored in Aczel [1980] and, from a different
perspective, in Thiel [1975] and Martin [1982].) As the formal logic of
Frege (and Whitehead-Russell) was transformed gradually into mathematical
logic, notably by Tarski and Gödel, interest in the task of giving meaning
explanations for interpreted formal languages faded out and after World War
II the current distinction between syntax and (Tarskian, model-theoretic)
semantics has become firmly entrenched.
The type theory of Martin-Löf [1975, 1982, 1984] represents a remark-
able break with this tradition in that it returns to the original Fregean para-
digm: interpreted formal language with careful explanations of meaning.
Owing to limitations of space I shall not be able to give a detailed, precise
description of the system here, (a task for which Martin-Löf [1984] uses
close to a hundred pages), but will confine myself to trying to convey the
basic flavour of the system.
A possible route to Martin-Lofs theory is through further examination of
Heyting's explanations of the meaning of the logical constants. Our tentative
semantics in Section 5 above made tacit use of a refinement of the expla-
nations: the proof-tables do not give just proofs but canonical, or direct
l
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proofs. A further refinement can be culled from Heyting's own writings.
(In Sundholm [1983] a fairly detailed examination of Heyting's writings
on this topic is offered.) According to Hey ting, in order to prove a theorem
one has to carry out certain constructions, 'die gewissen Bedingungen
genügen', namely that it produces a mathematical object with certain specified
properties, cf. e.g., his remarks on the proposition
"Euler's constant is rational"
*,
in [1931], p. 113. In Martin-Lofs system, the proof-tables are extended to
contain also the information about the objects that need to be constructed
in order to establish the truth of the propositions in question. Thus, taking
both refinements into account, the meaning of a proposition is explained by
telling what a canonical object for the proposition would be. (A canonical
object is not needed in order to assert the proposition; an object (method,
program) that can be evaluated to canonical form is enough. For more
details here, see Martin-Löf [1984].) In fact, according to Martin-Löf, one
also has to tell when two such objects are equal. On the other hand, when
 (
one defines a set constructively, one has to specify what the canonical ele-
ments are and what it is for two elements of the set to be equal elements.
Thus, the explanations of what propositions are and of what sets are, are
completely analogous and Martin-Lofs system does not differentiate between
the two notions.
In ordinary formal theories, that are formulated in the predicate calculus, »
the derivable objects are propositions (or, rather, they are well-formed
formulae, i.e., the formalistic counterparts of propositions). This leads to
certain difficulties for the standard formulation where logical inference is
a relation between proposition. As was already observed by Frege, the correct *
formulation of modus ponens is
A -» B is true A is true
B is true
It is simply not correct to say that the proposition B follows from the propo-
sitions A -+B and A. What is correct is that the truth of the proposition B
follows from the truth ofA-*B and the truth of A. Thus the premises and
conclusions of logical inferences are not propositions but judgements as to
the truth of propositions. Furthermore, as Martin-Löf notes, that in order to
keep the rules formal, one should also include the information that A and B
are propositions in the premises of the rules, e.g.,
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A is a prop. _ Β is a prop. _ A is true
Α ν Β is true
is how v-introduction should be set out. Therefore, as the premises of infer-
ences are judgements, and remembering the identification of propositions and
sets, one finds two main sorts of judgements in the theory, namely
(a) A set ('A is a set')
and
(b) a E A ('a is an element of the set A ').
- '.'
(In fact, there are two further forms of judgement, namely 'A is the same set
as B' and 'a and b are equal elements of the set A '.)
In accordance with the above discussion, (a) also does duty for 'A is a
proposition' and (b) can also be read as 'the (proof-)object a is of the right
sort for the proposition A , meets the condition specified by the proposition
A\ This reading of (b) is, constructively, a longhand for the judgement
, '(the proposition) A (is) true', which is used whenever it is convenient to
suppress the extra information contained in the proof-object. A third reading,
deriving from Heyting and Kolmogorov, is possible, where (a) is taken in the
sense 'A is a task (or problem)" and (b) in the sense 'a is a method for carrying
out the task A (solving the problem A)\ When the task-aspect is emphasized,
another reading would be 'a is a program that meets the specification A' and
1
 the type-theoretical language of Martin-Lof [1982] has, owing to this possi-
bility, had considerable influence as a programming language.
Some feeling for the interaction between propositions and proof-objects
may be obtained through consideration of the simple example of conjunction.
The proposition Α Λ Β (or set Α χ Β) is explained, on the assumption that
A and B are propositions, by laying down that a canonical element of Α χ Β
is a pair (a, b) where α €Ξ.4 and b£B. Thus the χ -introduction rule is correct:
a&A
Using the shorthand reading, when the proof-objects are left out, we also see
that the rule of Λ-introduction is correct:
A true B true
Α Λ Β true
For the Λ-eliminations we need the use of the projection-functions ρ and q
that are associated with the pairing-function. Consider the rule
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A Λ Β true
A true
Restoring proof-objects, we see that from an element cEA ΛΑ, one has to
find an element of A. But c is an element of Α Λ Β, and so c is equal to (is a
method for finding, can be evaluated, or executed, to) a canonical element
(a,b)£A Λ Β. Apply ing the projection p, we see that ρ (c) = p((a,b)) =
so the proper formulation will be
It should be mentioned, however, that the conjunction is not a primitive
set-formation operation in the language of Martin-Lof. On the contrary, a
suitable candidate can be defined from other sets and the appropriate rules
derived.
A slightly more complex example is provided by the universal quantifi-
cation (Vx&A)B[x] and implication A-*B, both of which are treated as
variants of the cartesian product (Πχ G Λ )/?[*] of a family of sets. This
product may be formed only on the assumption that we have a family of sets
over A, that is, provided that Β [χ] is a set, whenever χ &Α. Thus the forma-
tion rule will take the form
A set _ B[x] set
(ΠχΕΑ)Β[χ] set
(This serves to illustrate the important circumstance that the basic judge-
ments may depend on assumptions. Better still, we should say that the right
premise is a hypothetical judgement Β [χ] set (provided that χ € /I).) In order
to understand the Π-formation rule one needs to know what a canonical
element of (Πχ Ε Α) Β [χ] would be; this is told by the Π -introduction rule
b[x]
that is, the canonical elements are functions hx.b[x], such that b[x]
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provided that χ €Ξ A. Just as in the case of conjunction, where the elimination
rule was taken care of by matching the pairing function with a projection,
one will obtain the elimination rule through a similar match between λ-
abstraction and function-application, ap. Thus the rule takes the form
x]
ap(F,a)eB[a/x]
(In order to understand this rule one makes use of an important connection
between abstraction and application, namely the law
ap(\x.b[x],a) = b(a/x}. I
For the details of the explanation, refer to Martin-Lof [1982] or [1984]).
- If the set (proposition) ß[x] does not depend on χ the product is written
as the set of functions BA (as the proposition >i -*B). The rules are obvious,
with the exception of -»--formation:
A true1
A prop Β prop
A ->-B prop '
Here the formation rule is stronger than the usual rule (where A and Β both
have to be propositions) because the right premise is weaker in that Β has to
be a proposition only when A is true. This concept of implication has been
used by Stenlund in an elegant theory of definite descriptions, cf. his [1973]
and [1975].
The other quantification is taken care of by means of the disjoint union of
a family of sets. The Σ-formation rule takes the form
A set B[x] set
set
The canonical elements are given by the Σ-introduction rule
bGB[a/x]
(a, b)
On the prepositional reading, where the disjoint union is written as the
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quantifier (3x £A)B[x], we see that in order to establish an existence claim
one has to (i) exhibit a suitable witness a €E A and (ii) supply a suitable
proof-object b that the witness α G A does, in fact, satisfy the condition
imposed by B [ x ] . The inclusion of the proof-object b allows yet a third
use for the disjoint union, namely that of restricted comprehension-terms.
What would, on a constructive reading, be meant by 'an element of the set
of x's in A such -that A[JC]'? At least one would have to include a witness
a&A and information (=a proof-object) establishing that a satisfies the
condition Β [χ]. Thus the canonical elements of the restricted comprehension-
term {χ (ΞΑ : B [ x ] } coincide with the canonical elements of the disjoint sum.
This representation of 'such that' provides the key to the actual development
of, say, the theory of real numbers given the set Ν of natural numbers. A real
number will be an element of NN such that it obeys a Cauchy-condition.
At this point I will refrain from further development of the language and
instead I shall apply the type-theoretic abstractions that have been introduced
so far to the notorious "donkey-sentence"
(*) Every man who owns a donkey beats it.
The problem here is, of course, that formulations within ordinary predicate
logic do not seem to provide any way to capture the back-reference of the
pronoun 'it'. A simple-minded formalization yields
(**) Vx(Man(x) Λ 3y(Donkey(y) Λ Own(x, y)} -» Beats(x, ?)).
There seems to be no way of filling the place indicated by '?', as the donkey
has been quantified away by 'j>'.
Using the disjoint-union manner of representation for restricted compre-
hension-terms one finds that 'a man who owns a donkey' is an element of
the set
{x G MAN: (3y € DONKEY)OWN [x,y]}.
Such an element, when in canonical form, is a pair (m, b), where m G MAN
and 6 is a proof-object for (3j> € DONKEY)OWN [m/x, y]. Thus b, in its
turn, when brought to canonical form, will be a pair (d, c), where d is a
DONKEY and c a proof-object for OWN [m/x, d / y ] . Thus for an element ζ
of the comprehension-term 'MAN who OWNs a DONKEY' the left projection
p(z) will be a man and the right projection q(z) will be a pair whose left
projection p(q(zj) will be the witnessing donkey. Putting it all together we
get the formulation
(***) (Vz e {x € MAN : (3y € DONKEY)OWN [x, y]})
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In this manner, then, the type-theoretic abstractions suffice to solve the
problem of the pronominal back-reference in (*). It should be noted here
that there is nothing ad hoc about the treatment, since all the notions used
have been introduced for mathematical reasons in complete independence
of the problem posed by (*). On the other hand one should stress that it is
not at all clear that one can export the 'canonical proof-objects' conception
of meaning outside the confined area of constructive mathematics. In parti-
cular, the treatment of atomic sentences such as 'OWN[x, y]' is left intoler-
ably vague in the sketch above and it is an open problem how to remove that
vagueness.
Martin-Lofs type theory has attracted a measure of metamathematical
attention. Peter Aczel [1977, 1978, 1980, 1982], in particular, has been a
tireless explorer of the possibilities offered by the type theory. Other papers
of interest are Oilier [1980], Diller and Troelstra [1984] and Beeson [1982].
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Note added in proof (October 1985)
Per Martin-Lofs 'On the meanings of the logical constants and the justifica-
tions of the logical laws' in Atti degli incomtri di logica matematica vol. 2,
Scuola di Specializzazione in Logica Matematica, Dipartimento di Mate-
matica, Université di Siena, 1985, pp. 203—281, was not available during the
writing of the present chapter. In these lectures, Martin-Lof deals with the
topics covered in Sections 4-6 above in great detail and carries the philosoph-
ical analysis considerably further.
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